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Abstract 
In two experiments, we investigated whether imposing a secondary task is an 
effective technique for detecting child deceit. Firstly, 85 children aged 8 to 11 years 
old provided either a true or false report of a recent school event. At interview, some 
children were asked to gaze towards either the interviewer’s face (IF) or a teddy 
bear’s face (TF), whereas some children were given no gaze instruction. In both the 
IF and TF conditions, lie-tellers provided significantly fewer details than truth-tellers. 
192 adult evaluators then judged the credibility of ten children’s reports from one of 
the three ‘gaze’ conditions with and without guidance on level of detail. Evaluators 
discriminated truths from lies successfully when judging children instructed to look at 
IF, but not when children were asked to gaze towards TF. Evaluators who received 
guidance demonstrated better discrimination between true and false reports than 
evaluators who received no such information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Look this way’: Using gaze maintenance to facilitate the detection of children’s 
false reports 
Child deception research has focused on both the developmental origins of 
children’s lie-telling behaviours, and the forensic implications of deceptive child 
testimonies going undetected (see Talwar & Crossman, 2012 for a review).  Past 
research has painted a bleak picture: Children not only have the potential to lie in 
forensic interviews (Tye, Amato, Honts, Devitt & Peters, 1999), but, when the video-
recordings of their statements are presented to legal professionals (e.g. police officers, 
judges), they experience great difficulty in uncovering false testimonies (Bala, 
Ramakrishan, Lindsay & Lee, 2014; Leach, Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2004).  
Thus, if children do decide to provide deceptive reports, then they could easily slip 
through the net resulting in miscarriages of justice that are damaging to both the 
victims and defendants (O’Donohue, Benuto & Fanetti, 2010).  Clearly, more 
effective deception detection strategies are needed. 
 Cognitive processing is an important factor in deception (Zuckerman, DePaulo 
& Rosenthal, 1981), particularly for children whose growing cognitive abilities are 
closely related to their ability to maintain false reports (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).  
Indeed, children’s development of global executive functioning (Gordon, Lyon & 
Lee, 2014) as well as their development of specific executive functions, such as 
inhibitory control, working memory, executive planning and forward search planning, 
significantly contribute to their ability to conceal incriminating information when 
questioned (Alloway, McCallum, Alloway & Hoicka, 2015; Evans & Lee, 2011; 
Talwar & Lee, 2008; Williams, Leduc, Crossman & Talwar, 2016).  Furthermore, lie-
telling proficiency follows the developmental patterns of cognitive processes, such as 
inhibitory control (Debey, De Schryver, Logen, Suchotzki & Verschuere, 2015).  This 
suggests that child lie-tellers, who are still developing certain cognitive skills that 
might facilitate their lie-telling, might be affected by any interview technique that 
impacts upon these skills. 
Growing research into adult deception has highlighted cognitive lie detection 
(CLD) as a promising strategic tool.  Based on the well-established premise that lying 
is more cognitively demanding than truth-telling (e.g. Christ, Essen, Watson, 
Brubaker & McDermott, 2009; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Kronkvist, 2006; 
Mann & Vrij, 2006), CLD manipulates cognitive load, which refers to information-
processing demands (associated with attentional and working memory) (Block, 
Hancock & Zakay, 2010), and transforms it into a system variable (Vrij, 2015).  As a 
result, CLD techniques exaggerate behavioural differences between truth-tellers and 
lie-tellers, ultimately leading to impressive improvements in correct judgements of 
truths (57% for standard approach to 67% for CLD approach) and correct judgments 
of lies (47% for standard approach, 67% for CLD) (Vrij, Fisher & Blank, 2015).  By 
taxing this cognitive load further, CLD decreases lie-telling performance.  Children 
should be particularly susceptible to the negative effects of increased cognitive 
demand because their developing cognitive abilities, which already reveal their deceit, 
would be put under further strain. 
Imposing cognitive load 
Imposing cognitive load transforms the cognitive demand experienced by 
interviewees into a system variable through the addition of a secondary task (Vrij, 
2015).  Knowles (1963) proposed that each person has a limited pool of attentional 
resources that are differentially allocated to tasks according to difficulty.  A difficult 
task, such as lie-telling, would draw more resources from this pool than a less difficult 
task, such as truth-telling.  Lie-tellers would, therefore, have fewer resources (than 
truth-tellers) remaining if the pool were finite. 
This asymmetry in the availability of cognitive resources for truth-tellers and 
lie-tellers has two consequences for lie-tellers when a secondary task is imposed.  
First, lie-tellers experience an overall increase in cognitive demand, working at or 
near to full attentional capacity.  This means that lie-tellers exhibit more behavioural 
cues indicative of cognitive load compared to truth-tellers.  Second, interference 
between the tasks may arise.  When working at cognitive capacity, performance will 
depend on a person’s ability to divide his or her attention in accordance with task 
demands.  Attention can be flexibly allocated from moment to moment (Kahneman, 
1973): As the secondary task becomes more difficult, additional resources can be 
allocated.  If the tasks share a particular pool of resources, then diverting resources 
from the primary task to the secondary task should result in a trade-off (i.e. decreasing 
performance for the primary task and increasing performance for the secondary task).   
Imposing cognitive load in order to detect deception could be particularly 
effective with a younger population whose ability to manage their attentional 
resources has not yet fully matured.  Before the age of 11 years, children find it 
difficult to differentially allocate their attention in dual-task processing (Irwin-Chase 
& Burns, 2000).  Furthermore, research has shown that the increase in cognitive load 
experienced, when moving from single tasks to dual-tasks, is greater for children than 
it is for adults (Karatekin, 2004).  Although 10-year-olds can allocate their attention 
similarly to adults, their control over attention management in response to task 
difficulty is not yet fully developed.  In the context of the current study, this suggests 
that child lie-tellers may overcompensate for the rising demands of a secondary task, 
diverting too many resources away from the primary task of lie-telling,, thus 
decreasing their performance on this task.  It is also possible that children may 
prioritise the primary task, sacrificing their performance on the secondary task. 
To date, two studies have examined the effects of cognitive lie detection 
techniques on children.  Firstly, Liu et al. (2010) asked unanticipated questions of 
children aged 10 to 12 years old about a non-experienced life event.  They found that, 
compared to truth-tellers, child lie-tellers were more likely to respond to unexpected 
questions.  Secondly, Saykaly, Crossman, Morris and Talwar (2016) imposed 
cognitive load by asking children to falsely allege or deny play with a certain toy 
using the ‘reverse order’ interview instruction. Their results revealed that reverse 
order recall made it harder for child lie-tellers to maintain their reports compared to 
child truth-tellers, suggesting that telling a story backwards does increase cognitive 
demands.  In summary, both these studies indicated that, when children have to 
perform a secondary task (i.e. answering a difficult question) at the same time as 
maintaining their false reports, their ability to maintain the lie is negatively affected.  
In the current experiment, the secondary task, introduced at interview, was an 
instruction to maintain gaze with either the interviewer’s face or a teddy bear’s face:  
A secondary task that has yet to be investigated with children. 
Gaze maintenance 
Using a systematic approach, Glenberg, Schröder and Roberston (1998) 
demonstrated that as the cognitive demands (i.e. cognitive difficulty) of a task 
increase, adults naturally avert their gaze.  This cognitive strategy of gaze aversion is 
functional, as adults performed better on moderately difficult questions when they 
disengaged from (i.e. closed their eyes), rather than engaged with (i.e. looked at the 
interviewer’s nose), disruptive visual components in their environment.  Looking 
towards a visual/social stimulus, therefore, interfered with their task performance 
when the cognitive demands of the task were moderate. This behavioural response to 
avoid cognitive overload has also been investigated with children.  Doherty-Sneddon, 
Bruce, Bonner, Longbotham and Doyle (2002) compared gaze aversion behaviour in 
children aged 5 and 8 years old in response to easy (low cognitive load) and difficult 
(high cognitive load) questions.  Results revealed that the older children averted their 
gaze away from the questioner’s face more frequently in response to rising question 
difficulty (i.e. cognitive effort), but that this gaze pattern was only observed for 
younger children for certain types of questions.  This suggests that gaze aversion is 
used as an overt response to cognitive effort more consistently with increasing age.  In 
addition, there is evidence to support that the primary function of gaze aversion is to 
manage cognitive demands rather than as a response to social difficulty.  Doherty-
Sneddon and Phelps (2005) measured gaze aversion in 8-year-old children who were 
questioned either face-to-face or via live video link.  Results revealed that question 
difficulty strongly influenced gaze aversion in both interview conditions.   In the 
current study, it was anticipated that, as children’s ages ranged from 8 to 11 years old, 
they would attempt to use gaze aversion to reduce cognitive effort more so in the ‘lie-
telling’ condition where cognitive load is higher than in the ‘truth-telling’ condition.  
Requiring interviewees to maintain gaze during questioning, as was the case for this 
study, would disable this coping mechanism for lie-tellers and maintain the increased 
cognitive demands of providing a false report.  Furthermore, as maintaining gaze is 
not a natural behaviour, it would be necessary for interviewees in this experiment to 
intentionally remind themselves to comply with our gaze instruction, creating 
additional cognitive load. 
In a previous study, maintaining eye contact was used to impose cognitive 
load on adult interviewees (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010). The researchers found 
that requiring eye contact elicited two cognitive cues (out of 14 cues) that 
discriminated lie-tellers from truth-tellers; namely, deceitful accounts contained fewer 
spatial details and were more chronological compared to truthful accounts.  No 
significant differences were elicited between truth-tellers and lie-tellers when 
interviewees were given no ‘eye contact’ instruction.  In terms of detection accuracy, 
the small difference in elicited cues only improved lie detection accuracy from 44% in 
the ‘control’ condition to 53% in the ‘eye contact’ condition.  If an improvement in 
accuracy rates is dependent on the exaggeration of behavioural differences between 
truth-tellers and lie-tellers, then eliciting two cognitive cues did not suffice.  Vrij et al. 
(2010) suggest that these findings may be the product of anxiety for lie-tellers rather 
than increased cognitive load.  Alternatively, previous research has shown that, even 
when adults find maintaining gaze with a person’s face to be more difficult than either 
looking at the floor or closing their eyes, this does not result in them performing 
worse in the former condition compared to the latter two gaze conditions (Doherty-
Sneddon, Bonner & Bruce, 2001).   
On the contrary, the difficulty that children experience when instructed to 
direct their gaze does translate into poorer performance compared to a control 
condition involving no gaze instruction.  In their first experiment, Doherty-Sneddon et 
al. (2001) compared the effect of gaze instruction (look at the speaker vs. look at the 
floor vs. close your eyes) on both adults’ and 10-year-old children’s task 
performance.  Like adults, most children (83%) found looking at the floor or closing 
their eyes to be the easiest (least cognitively demanding) conditions.  Results showed 
that, when children looked at the floor, this reported ease translated into them 
performing significantly better than when they looked at the speaker.  This difference 
in task performance was also found across Doherty-Sneddon et al.’s subsequent 
experiments for different tasks and for a younger age group (6 years old).  Children, 
therefore, experienced great difficulty in moderating the negative effects of gaze 
maintenance, with looking towards a face resulting not only in increased levels of 
cognitive demand for children, but also diminished task performance (Doherty-
Sneddon et al., 2001).  Thus, it was anticipated, for the current study, that children’s 
interview performance would be affected by gaze maintenance. 
Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether an instruction to maintain 
gaze would exaggerate differences between children’s true and false reports.  With a 
view to the future practical value of this research, it was important to consider how 
appropriate an instruction to maintain gaze would be with a child population.  As 
maintaining gaze has already been linked to anxiety (Vrij et al., 2010), asking a child 
to look at an interviewer’s face may intimidate some interviewees.  In this study, we 
instructed some of the children to look at a face stimulus considered to be less 
intimidating; a teddy bear’s face.  It should be noted that toys can be useful in child 
witness interviews (Wilson & Powell, 2001), and a teddy bear was chosen because it 
has a face and is non-gender specific. 
In this experiment, we predicted that lie-tellers would experience more dual-
task interference than truth-tellers when instructed to maintain gaze.  That is, lie-
tellers’ ability to provide a detailed account would be more negatively associated with 
their level of gaze compliance, compared to truth-tellers (Hypothesis 1).  Secondly, 
we anticipated that this dual-task interference would exaggerate subtle differences in 
level of detail between true and false reports.  Thus, it was expected that child lie-
tellers would provide reports that were significantly less detailed than those provided 
by child truth-tellers, and this difference in detail would be greater for children 
instructed to maintain gaze compared to children given no gaze instruction 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-five children (37 boys, 48 girls) aged 8 to 11 years old (M = 10.46 
years, SD = .81 years) were recruited from four primary schools in the United 
Kingdom.  Participant information sheets were sent home to children’s legal 
guardians who returned a signed written consent form.  The general procedure was 
outlined to the children to obtain their verbal assent to participation, but they were 
naïve to the specific purpose of the study and to the anticipated effect of maintaining 
gaze.  All children, who were asked to lie, complied with the request to lie.  
Verification was sought from teachers that they had not taken part in the event that 
they were interviewed about.  All children received a certificate and a stationery set in 
exchange for taking part. 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in two quiet areas of each school and involved the 
Principal Investigator (PI) who ran the study and a Research Assistant who conducted 
all interviews and was blind to the aims and hypotheses of the study.  All children 
were tested individually. 
The PI invited each child to take part in a short interview about a recent event 
at their school, thus events differed across schools.  These events included a school 
sports day, a visit to the local cathedral, a school play, and a music concert.  Children 
were randomly assigned to a Veracity condition within each year group in each school 
so that there were roughly equal numbers of truth-tellers and lie-tellers for each of the 
four events.  Truth-tellers (n = 39, Mage = 10.28 years, SDage = .83 years) were 
interviewed after they had experienced the event and were asked to provide a truthful 
recollection of what happened.  Lie-tellers (n = 46, Mage = 10.43 years, SDage = .81 
years), on the other hand, were interviewed about an event that they had not 
experienced and were asked to convince the interviewer that they had already taken 
part in the event, when in fact they had not.  This is similar to the veracity allocation 
carried out by other researchers interested in eliciting false allegations from children 
(e.g. Akehurst, Köhnken & Höfer, 2001); Brunet et al., 2013; Lyon, Malloy, Quas & 
Talwar, 2008). 
Within their veracity groups, children were also randomly assigned to a Gaze 
Instruction condition: Look at the interviewer’s face (IF, n = 28, Mage = 10.25 years, 
SDage = .80 years) or Look at the teddy bear’s face (TF, n = 29, Mage = 10.52, SDage 
=.74 years) or No gaze instruction (Control, n = 28, Mage = 10.32 years, SDage = .91 
years).  The teddy bear was seated on the interviewer’s lap throughout all interviews 
(i.e. for all conditions).  Prior to the interview, children in the IF and TF conditions 
were instructed by the PI to maintain gaze with the relevant face stimulus as much as 
they possibly could throughout the interview (i.e. to look at it as much as they could 
remember to do so).  All children then received a sheet listing general themes that 
they could tell the interviewer about (e.g. talk about who was there, what happened, 
when it happened).  This does not constitute coaching as neither truth-tellers nor lie-
tellers were told exactly what they should say and they did not rehearse their story 
with the PI.  Providing children with these themes was anticipated to elicit longer 
statements, allowing for more cues to deceit to occur (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, 
Vernham & Fisher, 2015; Vrij, 2015).  All participants were given approximately 
three minutes to prepare themselves before the PI escorted them to the interview 
room.  Before entering the interview room, children in the IF and TF condition were 
given a final reminder by the PI to maintain gaze with the relevant face stimulus.  
Thsis was done out of earshot of the interviewer so that she remained blind to the 
aims and hypotheses of the study. 
The interview protocol reflected the initial stages of a Cognitive Interview 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 1992): A rapport-building phase (that took place off-camera) 
was followed by two open-ended questions.  First, an invitation to provide a free, 
uninterrupted narrative (e.g. tell me everything that happened when you took part in 
your school sports day), and then, secondly, a request, to all interviewees, to provide 
one additional piece of information about an aspect of the event that they had not 
already mentioned.  No other questions were asked.  All children were video-
recorded, and their interviews later transcribed.  All interviewees were asked the 
following question, which served as a manipulation check: Where were you instructed 
to look during the interview? The response options were ‘interviewer’s face’, ‘teddy 
bear’s face’ or ‘no instruction given’. 
Coding for detail 
Two independent coders rated the children’s interview transcripts for number 
of details included.  To make the coding more precise, all transcripts were coded for 
five different types of details; visual details (e.g. “white clay head” contains three 
visual details), auditory details (e.g. “the teacher told us to take deep breaths” contains 
one auditory detail), spatial details (e.g. “he stood behind the curtain” contains one 
spatial detail), temporal details (e.g. “at the end we left” contains one temporal detail), 
and action details (e.g. “we played football” contains one action detail).  One coder 
coded all of the transcripts for the current study, whilst the second coder rated a 
random sample of 20 transcripts.  Considering that general level of detail is a reliable 
indicator of veracity (DePaulo et al., 2003), total number of details was calculated for 
each interviewee, by adding together the scores for all five detail types.  Intra-class 
correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated for the two coders.  Inter-rater 
reliability was high, with all ICCs demonstrating high levels of agreement between 
coders (visual details, ICC = .96; auditory details, ICC = .98; spatial details, ICC = 
.94; temporal details, ICC = .96; action details, ICC = .92; and total number of details, 
ICC = .98). 
Coding for gaze maintenance 
To provide an objective measure of gaze behaviour, two different independent 
judges, using INTERACT 14.0 software (Mangold, 2015), coded all interviews (from 
start to end) for the amount of time (in seconds) that the child interviewees gazed 
towards the interviewer’s face (IF) and the teddy bear’s face (TF).  The duration of 
these gaze patterns for both face stimuli were then added together to give the total 
number of seconds spent gazing at the IF and the TF for each child.  Percentage of 
time spent gazing towards both the IF and the TF were calculated by taking the total 
number of seconds spent gazing towards each face stimuli, dividing it by the total 
length of the interview in seconds and multiplying it by 100.  Percentage of time spent 
gazing elsewhere was calculated by adding together the percentages for IF and TF and 
subtracting this total from 100.  First, both raters coded 17 interviews (20% of the 
total) to check for inter-rater reliability.  Inter-rater reliability was high for time spent 
looking at the interviewer’s face (ICC = .99) and at the teddy bear’s face (ICC = .91). 
Rater 1 then coded the next 40% of the video recordings (n = 34) and Rater 2 coded 
the remaining 40% of the video recordings (n = 34).  Percentage of time spent gazing 
at each face stimulus was calculated for each child by dividing the time spent gazing 
at the stimulus (in seconds) by the total duration of the interview (in seconds) and 
multiplying the result by 100. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
All 85 children correctly indicated where they had been asked to look during 
the interview.  To test level of compliance more objectively, two-way ANOVAs were 
performed with Veracity and Gaze Instruction as the between-subjects factors. These 
were conducted to investigate differences in percentage of time spent gazing at (a) the 
interviewer’s face, (b) the teddy bear’s face, and (c) elsewhere (i.e. towards neither 
face stimulus).  Figure 1 displays the distribution of gaze behaviour across ‘veracity’ 
conditions and Figure 2 across ‘gaze instruction’ conditions. 
 In terms of gazing towards the interviewer’s face, there was a significant main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 79) = 5.78, p = .019.  Children providing a false report (M = 
45.80%, SD = 22.41) spent a higher percentage of their interviews looking at the 
interviewer’s face than children providing a true report (M = 35.24%, SD = 23.72), d 
= .46, 95% CI [.03, .89].  There was also a significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, 
F(2, 79) = 10.50, p<.001.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment showed 
that children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 55.93%, SD = 24.97) 
spent a greater portion of the interview gazing at the interviewer’s face than children 
instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face (M = 31.61%, SD = 23.41, p<.001, d = .98, 
95% CI [.42, 1.52], or given no gaze instruction (M = 28.71%, SD = 17.49, p = .001, d 
= 1.04, 95% CI [.47, 1.59]).  There was no difference between these latter conditions, 
p = 1.00.  There was no significant interaction effect, F(2, 79) = 1.10, p = .34. 
 Figure 1.  Average percentage of time spent gazing at each face stimulus as a 
function of veracity 
In terms of gazing towards the teddy bear’s face, there was no significant main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 79) = .32, p = .57.  There was, however, a significant main 
effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 79) = 9.50, p<.001.  Pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni adjustment showed that instructing children to gaze at the teddy bear’s 
face (M = 16.77%, SD = 18.77) resulted in a higher percentage of time looking at the 
teddy bear’s face than instructing children to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 
5.22%, SD = 5.21, p = .001, d = .83, 95% CI [.29, 1.37]), or giving no gaze instruction 
(M = 4.66%, SD = 2.66, p<.001, d = .90, 95% CI [.35, 1.44]).  There was no 
difference between these latter conditions, p = 1.00.   There was no significant 
Veracity X Gaze Instruction interaction effect, F(2, 79) = .28, p = .76. 
 Figure 2.  Average percentage of time spent gazing at each face stimulus as a 
function of gaze instruction 
Finally, in terms of gazing elsewhere, there was a significant main effect of 
Veracity, F(1, 79) = 7.15, p = .009.  Truth-tellers (M = 56.66%, SD = 24.22) spent a 
higher proportion of the interview looking elsewhere compared to lie-tellers (M = 
44.48%, SD = 21.37), d = .54 (95% CI [.10, .97]).  There was also a significant main 
effect of Gaze Instruction, F(1, 79) = 7.99, p = .001.  Pairwise comparisons using 
Bonferroni adjustment showed that children given no gaze instruction (M = 61.73%, 
SD = 17.74) spent more time looking elsewhere compared to children instructed to 
look at the interviewer’s face (M = 38.85%, SD = 24.21), p<.001, d = 1.08 (95% CI 
[.51, 1.64]).  Percentage of time looking elsewhere did, however, not differ between 
children in the ‘control’ condition and those in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition (M = 
49.63%, SD = 22.61), p = .10.  There was also no significant difference in percentage 
of time spent gazing elsewhere between children in the ‘interviewer’s face’ condition 
and child in the ‘teddy bear’s face condition, p = .20.  There was no significant 
interaction effect, F(2, 79) = .80, p = .45. 
In sum, children were able to comply with the instruction to look at the 
interviewer’s face or the teddy bear’s face.  That said, although our instructions did 
increase time spent gazing toward a specific face stimulus, overall compliance was 
relatively poor as the average participant complied with their gaze instruction for less 
than 50% of their interview.  Furthermore, children in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ 
condition only spent 16% of the time looking at their specified stimulus and just as 
much time looking at the interviewer’s face and elsewhere as children in the ‘control’ 
condition.  This lack of compliance may be because gazing at a static toy when 
responding to a person is an unnatural behaviour.  It could also be because the 
location of the teddy bear was problematic; staring at the interviewer’s lap may have 
seemed strange. 
Hypotheses-testing 
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects of child age, child gender, 
or specific activity reported (e.g. sports day, school trip) during the interview, on any 
of the dependent variables.  The data for all participants were, therefore, combined for 
subsequent analyses. 
Dual task interference.  We investigated whether lie-tellers experienced more dual-
task interference than truth-tellers, when given the secondary task of maintaining gaze 
with either the interviewer’s face or the teddy bear’s face whilst being questioned.  
The ‘performance operating characteristic’ (POC, Norman & Bobrow, 1975) of truth-
tellers and lie-tellers was calculated separately for children in both ‘gaze instruction’ 
conditions.  By calculating Pearson’s correlations between the total number of details 
included in the interviewee’s account (i.e. level of detail) and the time they spent 
gazing towards either the interviewer’s or the teddy bear’s face (i.e. level of gaze 
compliance), we were able to examine to what extent the two tasks interfered with 
one another.  High levels of interference would be characterised by a strong negative 
correlation between performances on both tasks (i.e. increasing compliance with the 
gaze instruction resulting in decreasing level of detail in responses). 
First, when the secondary task required interviewees to look at the 
interviewer’s face, findings revealed a weak, negative correlation for truth-tellers, r = 
-.28, p = .40, and a small to moderate, positive correlation for lie-tellers, r = .39, p = 
.16.  Although these correlations are not significant, this may be due to the effect of a 
limited sample size.  Following the suggestion of Ferguson (2009), we therefore 
looked at the effect size of these correlations as “effect sizes are resistant to sample 
size influence, and thus provide a truer measure of the magnitude of effect between 
variables” (p. 532).  Interpreting these r values as effect sizes (Field, 2013), the data 
showed that there was a small effect for truth-tellers and a medium effect for lie-
tellers.  This suggests that there was mild interference between truth-tellers’ ability to 
provide detailed answers and their compliance with the gaze instruction.  However, it 
also shows that there was no interference for lie-tellers, whose level of detail in fact 
increased with their level of compliance with the gaze instruction.  Second, when 
interviewees were instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, there was no correlation 
between level of detail and compliance with the gaze instruction for truth-tellers, r = -
.04, p = .91, nor for lie-tellers, r = .08, p = .78. 
Level of detail.  Preliminary analyses showed that true reports (M = 750.79, SD = 
670.31) contained significantly more words than false reports (M = 508.33, SD = 
560.88), t(83) = 1.82, p = .037, d = .40 (95% CI [-.37, .82]).  As longer reports allow 
for more details to occur, length of statement would have an effect on our analysis of 
total detail.  To take this effect into account, length of statement (in words) was 
entered as a covariate in our analyses.  This is similar to previous work by Strömwall 
and Granhag (2005) when analysing reality-monitoring scores. 
First, a 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Gaze Instruction) ANCOVA was performed with 
total number of details as the dependent variable.  There was a significant main effect 
of Veracity, F(1, 78) = 8.44, p = .005, a significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, 
F(2, 78) = 3.16, p = .048, and a significant Veracity X Gaze Instruction interaction 
effect, F(2, 78) = 4.22, p = .018.  Descriptive statistics for each of the experimental 
cells are displayed in Table 1. 
Of interest for the hypotheses is the Veracity X Gaze Instruction interaction 
effect.  Separate ANCOVAs were conducted: first, for each of the Gaze Instruction 
conditions with Veracity as the independent variable, and second, for each of the 
Veracity conditions with Gaze Instruction as the independent variable.  When 
children were instructed to gaze at the interviewer’s face, truth-tellers provided 
significantly more details compared to lie-tellers, F(1, 25) = 8.53, p = .007, d = .92 
(95% CI [.13, 1.70]).  Similarly, when children were instructed to look at the teddy 
bear’s face, truth-tellers provided more details in their statements than lie-tellers, F(1, 
26) = 5.88, p = .023, d = .83 (95% CI [.058, 1.59]). Veracity did not have a significant 
effect on the number of details provided by children who were given no gaze 
instruction, F(1, 25) = .24, p = .63.   Irrespective of whether they were providing a 
true report or a false report, children in the control condition included the same 
amount of detail. 
 
Table 1.  Mean and Standard Deviations for Total Number of Details as a Function of 
Veracity and Gaze Instruction  
 True Report False Report Total 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Interviewer's face 178.77 152.50 79.00 42.91 125.32 117.72 
Teddy bear's face 152.46 86.93 92.94 56.81 119.62 76.65 
Control 117.15 99.39 114.80 119.17 115.89 108.42 
Total 149.46 116.21 95.52 79.27 120.27 101.03 
 
For children who provided a truthful account, there was a significant effect of 
Gaze Instruction condition, F(2, 35) = 4.04, p = .026.  Post-hoc testing using 
Bonferroni adjustment revealed that truth-tellers who looked at the interviewer’s face 
provided more details than truth-tellers who were given no gaze instruction, p = .03, d 
= .48 (95% CI [-.31, 1.25]).  There was no difference in quantity of detail between 
truth-tellers looking at the interviewer’s face and those looking at the teddy bear’s 
face, p = 1.00, and no difference between truth-tellers looking at the teddy bear’s face 
and those in the control condition, p = .14.  For children who provided a fabricated 
account, there was no significant effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 35) = .55, p = .58. 
Discussion 
The analysis of the association between providing a detailed account and 
complying with the gaze instruction revealed a small positive effect for lie-tellers in 
the ‘interviewer’s face’ condition.  That is, the more the lie-tellers looked at the 
interviewer’s face the more details they gave.  This was contrary to Hypothesis 1.  
Furthermore, the instruction to look at the teddy bear’s face did not elicit dual task 
interference for the lie-tellers nor for the truth-tellers.  Our theoretical assumption 
posited that lie-tellers, who have a more cognitively demanding primary task 
compared to truth-tellers, would reach the limit of their resources when a secondary 
task was imposed (Knowles, 1963), and, therefore, experience a high level of dual-
task interference (Kahneman, 1973).  However, our analysis of lie-tellers’ dual-task 
interference does not support this theoretical assumption.  Indeed, the positive 
relationship between level of detail and gaze compliance for lie-tellers instructed to 
look at the interviewer’s face completely contradicts our hypothesis.  This could be 
due to the cognitive resources required for each task originating from separate 
(limited) resources.  Multiple resource theory (Wickens, 2002) posits that tasks that 
are structurally dissimilar, such as answering interview questions (verbal) and 
maintaining gaze (visual/social), will interfere less.  This may explain why imposing 
cognitive load through constructing/maintaining a lie (verbal) and telling the lie in 
reverse order (verbal) had greater success in previous studies (Saykaly et al., 2016; 
Vrij et al., 2008) because the two tasks use similar cognitive processes. 
An alternative explanation could be that the effect of gaze maintenance on 
task performance can vary dependent on the relevance of the visual stimulus to the 
primary task (Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2001).  It could be the case, in the current 
study, that child lie-tellers instructed to look towards the interviewer’s face found the 
information communicated by her face more task-relevant than truth-tellers.  Lie-
tellers, who are more concerned with appearing honest than truth-tellers (Vrij, 2015), 
might have monitored the interviewer’s face for feedback on how their deception was 
being received and used this to modify their responses (e.g. to say more to appear 
honest).  However, this tactic works to their disadvantage, as longer statements are 
more likely to contain cues to deceit (Vrij et al., 2015).  This would particularly be the 
case for child interviewees who tend to reveal their deceit verbally (Talwar & Lee, 
2002).  Furthermore, these unanticipated findings might be explained by differences 
in children’s developing cognitive capabilities that are associated with lie-telling 
ability, such as executive functioning (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).  Child lie-tellers in 
our study may have had good working memory skills that allowed them to look at the 
interviewer’s face whilst telling their false report.  Future research should investigate 
whether the effects of imposing cognitive load are moderated by children’s growing 
cognitive development. 
Interestingly, truth-tellers instructed to look at the interviewer’s face did 
experience some dual-task interference.  This unexpected finding requires further 
investigation.  As memory can be data-limited (i.e. limited by a person’s ability to 
recall a past experience), it could be that factors other than gaze compliance 
influenced our child truth-tellers’ ability to provide a detailed account.  Finally, the 
absence of dual-task interference for children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s 
face could be explained by the teddy bear’s face not being as cognitively effortful to 
look at as the interviewer’s face.  As the teddy bear’s face did not provide any 
relevant feedback, it was not necessary for the interviewees to monitor it for 
suspicion.  Nevertheless, we suggest caution in interpreting these correlations due to 
their non-significant nature.  
 Irrespective of the findings for dual-task interference, significant differences 
in level of detail between child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers were only elicited 
when a secondary task was imposed.  For children instructed to look at the 
interviewer’s face, these findings are in line with previous work with adults (Vrij et 
al., 2010), which has also found exaggerated behavioural differences between truths 
and lies when gaze was maintained.  For children instructed to look at the teddy 
bear’s face, these findings extend current knowledge and demonstrate that gazing 
towards a non-human stimulus could act as a less threatening, but still effective, 
substitute in practice.  Although exaggerated differences occurred when a dual-task 
was imposed, it remains unclear from a theoretical standpoint why this was the case.  
The dual-task processes involved in providing a narrative and maintaining gaze 
require further examination to understand the theory behind this effect.  Indeed, 
further probing of the significant interaction suggests that using different gaze 
instructions does not have an effect on false reports but rather has an effect on true 
reports.  Thus, these exaggerated differences could be due to gaze maintenance 
facilitating longer truthful accounts rather than inhibiting false accounts.  Our findings 
suggest that the request to look at the interviewer’s face elicited true reports that were 
significantly more detailed than when no gaze instruction was provided.  This may be 
due to the demeanour of our interviewer; supportive interviewers have been shown to 
elicit longer reports (Vrij, 2015).  However, it is not within the scope of this research 
to draw any firm conclusions regarding these results.  Furthermore, these findings 
should be interpreted with caution.  Due to small experimental cell sizes, there is a 
risk of Type I error.  This study, therefore, requires replication with a larger sample 
size to verify that the interaction effect remains significant. 
 In this study we were not able to examine the memory accuracy of the truth-
tellers’ detailed reports.  Based on the information provided by the schools, we were 
only able to establish whether the children had taken part in the events or not, but, due 
to the scope of the events, we were unable to capture all of the information regarding 
the events to code for correct and incorrect details.  Future research is required to 
explore the relevance and accuracy of the reports provided by truth-tellers in the ‘gaze 
instruction’ conditions to understand the specific benefits of eliciting more details in 
true reports. 
In the current study the interview protocol was short and non-elaborative.  
Using open-ended questions did allow us to go beyond the majority of past research, 
which has primarily focused on forced-choice questions using temptation resistance 
paradigms, to examine how gaze maintenance would affect children’s longer 
narratives.  However, this does not reflect interview protocols in real-life police 
investigations with child witnesses, where a variety of question types are used.  We 
can, therefore, not generalize these findings to a whole police interview, but only to 
the beginning of the police interview where an uninterrupted free narrative is 
requested.  Finally, our study represents a ‘best case scenario’ in which a child 
provides a long narrative.  As we reduced our interview protocol to focus on two 
open-ended questions, it was important to facilitate long responses by providing all of 
the children with examples of the type of information they could provide and some 
time to prepare.  Child witnesses typically provide shorter statements than both their 
adolescent and adult counterparts (Jack, Leov & Zajac, 2014); this may be due to 
them not knowing what level of detail is required at interview (Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Esplin & Horowitz , 2007). Future research should continue to test the 
generalizability of these findings by using a procedure where no examples are 
provided. 
Despite the exaggerated difference in level of detail elicited between child 
truth-tellers and child lie-tellers in the dual-task gaze condition (compared to the 
single-task control condition), the major concern still remained whether evaluators 
would be able to discriminate between lie-tellers and truth-tellers more effectively 
when child interviewees were instructed to maintain gaze compared to when no gaze 
instructions were given.  We investigated this issue in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested the prediction that evaluators would discriminate 
better between truth-tellers and lie-tellers instructed to maintain gaze, than truth-
tellers and lie-tellers who were given no gaze instruction (Hypothesis 3). 
We also examined whether telling evaluators that truth-tellers provide more 
detail in their reports than lie-tellers would improve discrimination accuracy.  
Previous research into training to improve lie detection has shown that informing 
evaluators about empirically-supported verbal cues to deceit has the largest effect on 
their detection accuracy (Hauch, Sporer, Michael & Meissner, 2014).  Overall, level 
of detail has been found to be a key indicator of veracity (DePaulo et al., 2003).  It is 
also one of the general characteristics coded for in Criteria-Based Content Analysis 
(Steller & Köhnken, 1989) that has received the most support for distinguishing 
between child truth-tellers and child lie-tellers in the predicted direction (Vrij 2005).  
It was, therefore, anticipated that evaluators who received this guidance regarding 
detail would demonstrate better discrimination than evaluators who received no 
guidance (Hypothesis 4).  It was further predicted that an improvement in 
discrimination, as a result of guidance, would be most pronounced when judging the 
credibility of children instructed to maintain gaze, due to a greater difference in detail 
being elicited in these conditions in Experiment 1 (Hypothesis 5). 
Successful discrimination depends on whether evaluators can interpret 
behavioural cues correctly.  It was, therefore, important to recognise that gaze 
aversion can be perceived as a strong indicator of deception (Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006), even though this cue is non-diagnostic (DePaulo et al., 2003).  
We could not rule out the possibility that gaze behaviour perceived to be somewhat 
‘strange’ might impact on evaluators’ judgments of credibility.  Half of the evaluators 
were, therefore, played visual-audio clips of the children’s interviews, and the other 
half were played audio-only clips.  We anticipated that evaluators who watched the 
visual-audio presentations displaying the gaze maintenance behaviour would 
demonstrate a truth bias because gaze maintenance might be interpreted as a sign of 
truthfulness (Vrij et al., 2010) (Hypothesis 6). 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 192 adult evaluators (89 males, 103 females) with an age range of 
18 to 76 years (M = 27.14 years, SD = 11.71 years) was recruited.  One hundred and 
ten participants (52% of the total sample) were undergraduate students who received 
0.5 course credit for their participation.  The further 82 participants were members of 
the general public recruited via convenience sampling.  The non-student participants 
were not compensated for their participation. 
Interview clips 
A total of 30 interview clips were selected from the sample of 85 children in 
Experiment 1. There were ten clips per ‘Gaze Instruction’ condition; within each of 
those three sets of ten clips, there were five truth-tellers and five lie-tellers.  In the 
first round of the interview clip selection process, all recordings that contained noise 
interference (e.g. school bell, road traffic) were excluded (n = 20).  Second, clips in 
which the first free recall lasted longer than 300 seconds were removed (n = 7).  This 
criterion was chosen to limit the total duration of the study (50 minutes maximum), 
reducing potential fatigue effects on evaluators’ performance.  The remaining 58 clips 
were divided by Gaze Instruction condition (IF, n = 22; TF, n = 16; CONTROL, n = 
20), and five truth-tellers and five lie-tellers were randomly selected for each 
condition.  The final thirty clips were edited down so that they only contained the 
child interviewee’s first free recall.  This selection process resulted in an even 
distribution of gender (3 boys to 2 girls, or 2 boys to 3 girls) in each Veracity x Gaze 
Instruction cell, except for the false reports in the ‘control’ condition, which were all 
provided by boys.  It was not anticipated that this would bias results as no response 
bias has been previously found for adults judging boys’ credibility (Talwar, 
Crossman, Gulmi, Renaud & Williams, 2009).  Interview clips lasted from 53 seconds 
to 239 seconds (M = 135.67 seconds, SD = 56.16 seconds).  A 2 (Veracity) x 3 (Gaze 
Instruction) ANOVA was performed to ensure that there were no significant 
differences in length of clip across conditions.  There was no significant main effect 
of Veracity, F(1, 24) = .13, p = .72, no significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, 
F(2, 24) = .05, p = .96, and there was no significant Veracity X Gaze Instruction 
interaction effect, F(2, 24) = .62, p = .55.  For each ’gaze instruction’ condition, four 
random rotations of the ten clips were created to reduce order effects. 
Guidance on detail 
Evaluators who received guidance were provided with a sheet stating that 
truth-tellers provided more detail overall in their accounts compared to lie-tellers, as 
this has been reported in previous deception research (DePaulo et al., 2003) and was 
also found in Experiment 1.  To help evaluators understand what the experiment 
meant by the term ‘detail’, five different types of detail were presented in a table.  For 
each type of detail, a description and an example of that detail were provided (i.e. 
‘visual detail refers to what the interviewee said that they saw.  For example, a red hat 
contains two visual details’).  Participants were advised to refer back to the guidance 
sheet as much as they found useful when watching/listening to the interview clips and 
were able to ask the experimenter for clarification on these types of detail before and 
during the experiment. 
Procedure 
The study took place in a quiet environment with few distractions.  In order to 
prevent evaluators from working on the assumption that they would be presented with 
equal numbers of truth-tellers and lie-tellers, two steps were taken.  First, participants 
were informed that they would be asked to evaluate the veracity of twelve child 
interviews in turn (actually they only evaluated ten clips in total).  Second, they were 
told that it was just as likely for a child to be telling the truth as it was for them to be 
telling a lie.. 
First, evaluators were randomly assigned to a Gaze Instruction condition.  
That is, they judged the credibility of ten interview clips (five truth-tellers and five 
lie-tellers) from only one of the Gaze Instruction conditions in Experiment 1 (IF vs. 
TF vs. Control).  Evaluators who were provided with guidance on detail received this 
at the beginning of the experiment.  Half of the evaluators watched all of the 
interview clips in visual-audio format, whilst the other half listened to all interview 
clips in audio-only format.  Participants who watched visual-audio presentations of 
the interviewees in the ‘interviewer’s face’ and the ‘teddy bear’s face’ conditions 
were informed that the child interviewees had been asked by the experimenter to 
direct their gaze during the interviews.  Evaluators then watched and/or listened to the 
clips, one at a time, via a computer.  Headphones were provided.  To record their 
credibility judgments, evaluators were given a hard copy answer booklet.  Following 
each interview clip, evaluators were asked to decide if the child interviewee was lying 
or telling the truth. 
Participants’ dichotomous judgments (truth or lie) for each clip were used to measure 
hits (proportion of deceitful clips correctly identified as deceitful) and false alarms 
(proportion of truthful clips incorrectly identified as deceitful) for subsequent signal 
detection analysis. 
Results 
Accuracy 
Overall accuracy (M = 51.72%, SD = 16.23) was not significantly different 
from chance, t(191) = 1.47, p = .14, but truth accuracy (M = 60.62%, SD = 20.56) was 
significantly above chance, t(191) = 7.16, p<.001, d = .52 (95% CI [.37, .67]), and lie 
accuracy (M = 42.81%, SD = 21.23) was significantly below chance, t(191) = -4.69, 
p<.001, d= .34 (95% CI [.19, .48]).  When evaluators judged the credibility of 
children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 58.91%, SD = 16.44), they 
performed significantly better than chance, t(63) = 4.33, p <.001, d = .54 (95% CI 
[.28, .80]).  When judging children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face (M = 
47.97%, SD = 15.45) or children given no gaze instruction (M = 48.28% SD = 14.54), 
they were no better than chance (ps>.05).  Moreover, when evaluators were guided to 
look out for differences in detail (M = 53.96%, SD = 17.07), they were better than 
chance, t(95) = 2.27, p = .025, d = .23 (95% CI [.03, .43]), but not when no guidance 
was provided (M = 49.48%, SD = 15.11), t(95) = -.34, p = .74. 
Signal detection analysis 
The application of signal detection theory to deception detection research has 
been largely recommended because it provides an opportunity to measure two 
conceptually different parameters of accuracy (Meissner & Kassin, 2002); 
discrimination accuracy - ability to discriminate lie-tellers from truth-tellers (in this 
experiment, referred to as d’), and response bias – tendencies to favour a particular 
response (truth or lie) (in this experiment, referred to as β).  Means and standard 
deviations for discrimination accuracy and response bias across all conditions are 
displayed in Table 2. 
Discrimination accuracy.  A 3 (Gaze Instruction) x 2 (Guidance Provision) ANOVA 
was performed with participants’ sensitivity scores (d’) as the dependent variable to 
examine their ability to discriminate between truth- and lie-tellers. 
First, there was a significant main effect of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 180) = 
10.84, p<.001.  Post-hoc analyses using Bonferroni adjustment revealed that 
evaluators discriminated better between children’s truthful and deceptive accounts 
when the interviewees were instructed to look at the interviewer’s face compared to 
when the interviewees were instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, p<.001, d = .66 
(95% CI [.30, 1.02]), and when the interviewees were given no particular gaze 
instruction, p<.001, d = .67 (95% CI [.32, 1.03]).  Evaluators’ performance did not 
differ significantly between those instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face and for 
those given no instruction (p = 1.00). 
Second, there was a significant main effect of Guidance Provision, F(1, 180) = 
4.20, p = .042.  Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment showed that 
evaluators who received guidance discriminated better between veracity groups than 
evaluators who received no guidance, d = .27 (95% CI [-.014, .55]). 
Finally, there was a significant Gaze Instruction X Guidance Provision 
interaction effect, F(2, 180) = 4.88, p = .009.  We performed univariate analyses to 
test the effect of providing guidance within each Gaze Instruction condition.  There 
was a significant main effect of Guidance Provision for evaluators judging the 
credibility of child interviewees instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, F(1, 62) = 
12.10, p = .001. For evaluators in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition, those who 
received guidance (M = .22, SD = .76) were able to discriminate better than those who 
received no guidance (M = -.38, SD = .63), d = .87 (95% CI [.35, 1.38]).  There was 
no significant main effect of Guidance Provision for evaluators assigned to the 
‘interviewer’s face’ condition, F(1, 62) = 1.27, p = .26, or the ‘control’ condition, F(1, 
62) = 1.15, p = .29.  There were no other significant interaction effects (p-values 
>.05). 
In a second level of analysis, d’ values were compared to 0 (no ability to 
differentiate between children’s truths and lies) using one-sample t tests.  With regard 
to Gaze Instruction, evaluators could reliably discriminate child truth-tellers from 
child lie-tellers in the ‘interviewer’s face’ condition, t(63) = 4.32, p<.001, d = .54 
(95% CI [.28, .80]), but not in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition, t(63) = -.87, p = .39, 
nor the ‘no gaze instruction’ condition, t(63) = -.87, p = .38. For Guidance Provision, 
evaluators were able to discriminate reliably when provided with guidance, t(95) = 
2.30, p = .024, d = .23 (95% CI [.03, .44]), but not when guidance was withheld, t(95) 
= -.20, p = .84. 
Finally, we compared d’ scores to 0 for the significant interaction between 
Gaze Instruction and Guidance Provision.  When evaluators judged the credibility of 
children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face, they were able to discriminate lie-
tellers from truth-tellers whether guidance was provided (M = .55, SD = .85), t(31) = 
3.63, p = .001, d = .64 (95% CI [.26, .1.02]), or not (M = .32, SD = .75), t(31) = 2.43, 
p = .021, d = .43 (95% CI [.063, .79]).  For children instructed to look at the teddy 
bear’s face, evaluators were not able to discriminate between children’s truths and lies 
when provided with guidance (M = .22, SD = .76), t(31) = 1.65, p = .11, nor when 
there was no guidance provision (M = -.38, SD = .63), t(31) = -3.46, p = .002, d = .61 
(95% CI [.23, .98]).  That is, evaluators labelled the groups incorrectly (i.e. they 
tended to label lie-tellers as truthful and truth-tellers as deceitful).  Finally, when 
children were given no gaze instructions, evaluators were not able to discriminate 
truthful from fabricated reports, with guidance provision, (M = -.17, SD = .78), t(31) = 
-1.25, p = .22, or without guidance provision, (M = .018, SD = .64), t(31) = .16, p = 
.88. 
Response bias.  Participants’ response bias (β scores) was investigated to see whether 
they tended to identify children as lie-tellers or truth-tellers in any particular 
condition.  A three-way ANOVA, with Gaze Instruction, Guidance Provision and 
Modality of Presentation of the clips as between-subjects factors, revealed significant 
main effects of Gaze Instruction, F(2, 180) = 5.05, p = .007, and Modality of 
Presentation, F(1, 180) = 6.55, p = .011.  First, responses were more biased when 
judging the credibility of children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face (M = 
1.21, SD = .49) compared to children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face (M = 
1.02, SD = .37), p = .020, d = .46 (95% CI [.10, .81]), and children given no particular 
gaze instruction (M = 1.01, SD = .38, 95% CI [.92, 1.11]), p = .019, d = .45 (95% CI 
[.10, .80]).  Response bias did not significantly differ between evaluators judging 
child credibility in the latter two gaze conditions (p = 1.00).  Second, evaluators 
demonstrated more bias in the ‘audio-only’ condition (M = 1.16, SD = .48) than in the 
‘video-audio’ condition (M = 1.01, SD = .35), d = .36 (95% CI [.07, .64]).  There was 
no significant main effect of Guidance Provision and there were no significant 
interaction effects (p-values >.10). 
Using one-sample t tests, each β was compared to 1 (no bias).  In signal 
detection theory, β values below 1 signify a tendency to respond yes (or lie in the 
current study), whereas values above 1 signify a tendency to respond no (or truth in 
the current study; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).  Therefore, the subsequent analyses 
examined the existence and the nature of the bias.  With regard to Gaze Instruction, 
evaluators who judged the credibility of children instructed to look at the 
interviewer’s face were significantly biased to respond ‘truth’, t(63) = 3.46, p = .001, 
d = .43 (95% CI [.18, .69]), whereas no significant response bias was found for 
evaluators who judged children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, t(63) = .35, 
p = .73, nor for evaluators who judged children in the ‘no gaze instruction’ condition, 
t(63) = .30, p = .77.  In terms of Modality of Presentation, evaluators in the ‘audio 
only’ condition displayed a significant truth bias, t(95) = 3.18, p = .002, d = .33 (95% 
CI [.12, .53), whereas evaluators in the ‘video-audio’ condition showed no bias, t(95) 
= .17, p = .87. 
Table 2.  Discrimination Accuracy (d') and Response Bias (β) as a Function of Gaze 
Instruction, Guidance Provision and Modality of Presentation 
 d'  β 
  M SD   M SD 
Gaze Instruction      
Look at interviewer's face .43*** .80  1.21** .49 
Look at teddy bear's face -.08 .75  1.02 .37 
No instruction (control) -.08 .71  1.01 .38 
      
Guidance Provision      
Yes .20* .84  1.12 .48 
No -.02 .73  1.05 .36 
      
Modality of Presentation      
Video-audio -.04 .77  1.01 .35 
Discussion 
Instructing child interviewees to maintain gaze with the interviewer’s face 
enabled evaluators to discriminate between true and false reports to a better degree 
than when no instruction was given, in spite of a significant truth bias.  However, 
discrimination accuracy was not affected when child interviewees were instructed to 
gaze towards the teddy’s bear face.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported.  The 
ability to accurately detect deception for evaluators rating children instructed to gaze 
at the interviewer’s face may be due to differences in details provided by child truth-
tellers and child lie-tellers.  The cognitive lie detection approach posits that the ability 
to discriminate between truths and lies should increase with the activation and 
exaggeration of cognitive behavioural differences (Vrij, 2015).  Considering that 
significant behavioural differences were elicited for both children instructed to look at 
the interviewer’s face and children instructed to look at the teddy bear’s face, it is 
possible that the exaggeration of these cues might need to reach a certain threshold, 
beyond which they become more apparent to an evaluator.  It is possible that this 
threshold was only reached when child interviewees were instructed to look at the 
interviewer’s face, in turn, facilitating evaluators’ credibility judgments, but the 
threshold was not met when the children were asked to look at the teddy bear’s face. 
Informing evaluators that truth-tellers provide more detailed reports compared 
to lie-tellers did improve their ability to detect deception, thus supporting Hypothesis 
4.  However, it is difficult to conclude to what extent evaluators applied this guidance 
to the interview clips.  Although training in verbal content cues is recommended 
Audio only  .22** .80    1.16**   .48 
Note. Statistical tests compared d' to 0 and β to 1. 
* p<.05  ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
because it leads to the highest training effects, it is also important to note that false 
information regarding cues to deceit can work as effectively as true information 
(Hauch et al., 2014).  To encourage evaluators to engage more with the guidance and 
base their final credibility judgments on this specific information, it would be better to 
use methods such as the Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool (Evans, 
Michael, Meissner & Brandon, 2013) that include the rating of diagnostic cues in the 
final credibility assessment. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the provision of guidance was not more beneficial 
when judging children who were instructed to maintain gaze compared to those in the 
‘control’ condition.  Indeed, the only benefit of providing guidance was that it 
protected evaluators in the ‘teddy bear’s face’ condition from incorrectly labelling 
child veracity.  As children in this condition were neither maintaining eye contact, nor 
free to look where they wished, their ‘strange’ gaze behaviour of looking at the 
interviewer’s lap might have been interpreted incorrectly as suspicious.  Directing 
evaluators’ attention towards what the child was saying, through the use of our 
guidance, and encouraging them to base their credibility judgments on the child’s 
verbal behaviour, may have detracted from the misinterpretation of their ‘strange’ 
gazing towards the teddy bear. 
Finally, although we predicted in Hypothesis 6 that evaluators who watched 
the visual-audio presentations displaying the gaze maintenance behaviour would 
demonstrate a truth bias, this was not the case.  This lack of truth bias might be due to 
evaluators interpreting gaze maintenance behaviour differently from that suggested by 
the general deception literature.  On the one hand, gaze aversion is believed to be a 
cue to deceit (Global Deception Research Team, 2006), but, on the other hand, 
nonverbal behaviour that deviates from the expected norm, such as staring, can also 
be perceived to be ‘fishy’ (Bond et al., 1992).  It is not known to what extent gaze 
behaviour influenced evaluators’ judgments, or how much suspicion evaluators 
attached to this nonverbal cue; however, the lack of bias might suggest that opposing 
interpretations may have cancelled each other out.  Alternatively, informing 
evaluators that children had been instructed to divert their gaze may have made them 
more aware of their own bias. 
For the current study evaluators were exposed to ten interview clips.  This 
may have led to evaluators comparing cues and information across interviews.  In real 
police investigations and court proceedings, it is likely that these comparisons will 
occur between children’s statements, adult’s statements and physical evidence.  
Future research should try to replicate this scenario to understand how a police officer 
or juror might judge the credibility of a child both in isolation and in comparison to 
other sources. 
General Discussion 
We conducted the first empirical investigation exploring the use of gaze maintenance 
to detect deception in child witnesses during investigative interviews.  Similar to Vrij 
et al. (2010), we predicted that the interview strategy would magnify differences in 
level of detail between children’s true and false reports.  We also expected that the 
exaggeration of this cue would facilitate evaluators’ ability to discriminate children’s 
lies from truths. 
 The present findings show that gaze maintenance can be effective for 
determining the credibility of child witnesses.  In Experiment 1, lie-tellers provided 
significantly fewer details in their reports compared to truth-tellers but only when 
they were instructed to look towards either the interviewer’s face or a teddy bear’s 
face.  No significant difference was elicited when a secondary task was absent.  In 
Experiment 2, we found that the exaggeration of this diagnostic cue facilitated 
evaluators’ discrimination accuracy, but this was only when children were instructed 
to look at the interviewer’s face. 
Theoretically, the effect of imposing a secondary task on interviewee 
performance remains unclear.  The findings of Experiment 2 make it difficult to 
discern whether the secondary task had any negative impact on truth-tellers’ memory 
or whether lie-tellers experienced any additional cognitive load.  The latter issue may 
be due to the nature of the secondary task in this study and the difficulty in pinning 
down the exact cognitive mechanisms involved.  As previously mentioned, the 
development of certain cognitive skills is closely linked to children’s proficiency to 
tell and maintain lies (Talwar & Crossman, 2011).  It may therefore be wise, in future, 
to provide cognitive measures of the specific executive functions that the imposed 
secondary task aims to affect to be able to establish whether (a) there is a link 
between these cognitive skills and the performance on the tasks, and (b) whether 
children’s ability to perform these cognitive skills predicts the effectiveness of 
imposing cognitive load. When testing dual-task methodologies, it would also be 
beneficial to obtain baseline measures of an individual’s performance on single tasks 
(Task A only and Task B only) to which their performance on a dual-task (Tasks A 
and B simultaneously) could be compared. 
Our findings provide further support for the practical value of manipulating 
cognitive load as a potential means for discriminating between children’s true and 
false reports.  In particular, the results demonstrate that the effects of imposing 
cognitive load are not limited to asking children to tell their stories backwards.  This 
is beneficial because Saykaly et al. (2016) found that reverse order recall can 
adversely affect the accuracy of both truthful and deceptive statements, suggesting 
that it might not be helpful in real police investigations.  In our study, requiring child 
interviewees to perform the secondary task of maintaining gaze had a positive effect 
on truth-tellers, eliciting more information from them than when no gaze instruction 
was given.  This finding is in line with the primary goal of any investigative 
interview, which is to elicit as much information as possible from the interviewee.  
This finding could be due the interviewer’s supportive demeanour, which has been 
found with adults to elicit more details from truth-tellers than lie-tellers (Mann et al., 
2013).  Further investigation is required to determine whether it is the combined 
effect of a gaze maintenance instruction to witnesses and supportive interviewer 
behaviour that helps truth-tellers but not lie-tellers, rather than the technique on its 
own. 
A practical limitation of using gaze maintenance with child interviewees may 
be its appropriateness in certain contexts.  Maintaining gaze with an authoritative 
figure, such as a police officer, might be an intimidating task for children.  Although 
none of the children instructed to look at the interviewer’s face reported any 
discomfort, the average child did not maintain gaze for more than half of their 
interview.  A recent school event is far less traumatic to talk about than incidents of 
physical and/or sexual abuse, which can be the main focus of police investigations 
involving child witnesses.  Future research must examine the scope of the beneficial 
effects elicited in this study and balance them with potential discomfort in certain 
contexts.  As such, the preliminary findings relating to an instruction to concentrate 
on the less intimidating teddy bear (or similar) should be extended. 
Maintaining gaze, particularly with an interviewer’s face, is an effective strategy for 
judging the credibility of children.  Future research should continue to explore the 
application of dual-task processing to child interviews by examining strategies that 
target children’s under-developed executive functioning, with a view to creating more 
appropriate secondary tasks for this potentially sensitive context. 
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